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Abstract
Over the past years, literature has shown that attacks exploit-
ing the microarchitecture of modern processors pose a se-
rious threat to the privacy of mobile phone users. This is
because applications leave distinct footprints in the proces-
sor, which can be used by malware to infer user activities.
In this work, we show that these inference attacks are con-
siderably more practical when combined with advanced AI
techniques. In particular, we focus on profiling the activ-
ity in the last-level cache (LLC) of ARM processors. We
employ a simple Prime+Probe based monitoring technique
to obtain cache traces, which we classify with Deep Learn-
ing methods including Convolutional Neural Networks. We
demonstrate our approach on an off-the-shelf Android phone
by launching a successful attack from an unprivileged, zero-
permission App in well under a minute. The App thereby
detects running applications with an accuracy of 98% and
reveals opened websites and streaming videos by monitoring
the LLC for at most 6 seconds. This is possible, since Deep
Learning compensates measurement disturbances stemming
from the inherently noisy LLC monitoring and unfavor-
able cache characteristics such as random line replacement
policies. In summary, our results show that thanks to ad-
vanced AI techniques, inference attacks are becoming alarm-
ingly easy to implement and execute in practice. This once
more calls for countermeasures that confine microarchitec-
tural leakage and protect mobile phone applications, espe-
cially those valuing the privacy of their users.
1 Introduction
Today, more than 1 billion people use Android applica-
tions [47]. The security and privacy of these applications are
therefore of great relevance. The Android OS therefore em-
ploys a variety of protection mechanisms. Apps run in sand-
boxes, inter-process communication is regulated, and users
have some degree of control via the permission system. The
majority of these features protects against software-based at-
tacks and logical side-channel attacks. The processor hard-
ware, however, also constitutes an attack surface. In particu-
lar, the shared processor cache heavily speeds up the execu-
tion of applications. As a side effect, each application leaves
a footprint in the cache that can be profiled by others. These
footprints, in turn, contain sensitive information about the
application activity. Jana et al. [26] showed that browsing
activity yields unique memory footprints that allow to infer
accessed web pages. Oren et al. [39] demonstrated that these
footprints can be observed in the cache even from JavaScript
code distributed by a malicious website. While these attacks
have succeeded based on a solid amount of engineering,
the increasing complexity of applications, operating systems
(OS), and processors make their implementation laborious
and cumbersome. Yet, studying side-channel attacks is im-
portant to protect security and privacy critical applications in
the long term. We believe that machine learning techniques,
especially Deep Learning (DL), can help make side-channel
analysis significantly more scalable. DL thereby reduces the
human effort by efficiently extracting relevant information
from noisy and complex side-channel observations. At the
same time, DL introduces a new risk as attacks become more
potent and easier to implement in practice.
In this work, we demonstrate this risk and compile a ma-
licious Android application, which, despite having no privi-
leges or permissions, can infer private user activities across
application and OS boundaries. With the App, we are able
to detect other running applications with high confidence.
With this information, we focus on activities that happen
within an application. We detect visited websites in Google
Chrome and identify videos that are streamed in the Netflix
and Youtube applications. Those inferences are possible by
analyzing simple last-level cache (LLC) observations of at
most 6 seconds with advanced DL algorithms. The entire
attack succeeds in well under a minute and reveals sensi-
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
11
21
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 N
ov
 20
18
tive information about the mobile phone user. None of the
currently employed protection mechanisms prevent our at-
tack, as the LLC is shared between different processes and
can be monitored from user space. Our cache profiling tech-
nique is based on the Prime+Probe (P+P) attack [48], which
relies on cache eviction to monitor certain cache sets. In
contrast to previous work, we implement this eviction with
a dynamic eviction set test that succeeds even for imprecise
timing sources, random line replacement policies, and miss-
ing physical memory addresses information. This comes
at the cost of measurement accuracy and introduces a cer-
tain amount of noise in the cache observations. We counter
this effect by applying machine learning to the observations,
and compare classical algorithms to advanced deep learning
along the way. While Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and
Stacked AutoEncoders (SAEs) struggle during the classifi-
cation, Convolution Neural Networks (CNNs), a DL tech-
nique, succeed in efficiently extracting distinct features and
classifying the observations. As CNNs have recently gained
attention in the field of side-channel analysis, we explain our
parameter selection and compare it to related work. For the
implementation of our attack, we neither require the target
phone to be rooted nor the malicious application to have cer-
tain privileges or permissions. On our test device, a Nexus
5X, the Android OS is up-to-date and all security patches
are installed. The malicious code runs in the background,
requires no human contribution during the attack, and draws
little attention due to the short profiling phase.
Our Contribution. In summary, we
• propose an inference attack on mobile devices that
works without privileges, permissions, or access to spe-
cial interfaces.
• find eviction sets with a novel dynamic timing test that
works even with imprecise timing sources, random line
replacement policies, and virtual addresses only.
• classify cache observations using ML/DL techniques
(SVMs, SAEs, CNNs) and thereby infer running appli-
cations, opened websites, and streaming videos.
• achieve classification rates up to 98% with a profiling
phase of at most 6 seconds. The entire attack succeeds
in well under one minute.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides background information on classical and modern
machine learning techniques. Section 3 explains how we
profile the cache and conduct the inference attack. Section 4
presents the results of our experiments. Section 5 gives an
overview of previous works and compares our results with
other techniques. Section 6 concludes our work.
2 Background
This section briefly explains the basic concepts of the
ML/DL techniques that are used in this work.
2.1 Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
SVMs construct a classifier by mapping training data into a
higher dimensional space, where distinct features can effi-
ciently be separated. This separation is achieved with a lin-
ear or non-linear hyperplane that is built based on an error
term. The error term includes a penalty/regularization pa-
rameter that often ranges between 0 and 1. While bounding
the parameter in this range makes the optimization process
more expensive, it also enables higher success rates. For our
practical experiments, we enforce this bound and rely on the
SVM implementations in LibSVM [6].
2.2 Stacked AutoEncoders (SAEs)
An AutoEncoder (AE) is a type of neural network that can
be trained to reconstruct an input. The network consists of
two parts: an encoder function h = f (x) that extracts distinct
features from the input x and a decoder unit that reconstructs
the original data r = g(h). The network is trained such that
the error between r and x is minimized. Stacked AEs are then
constructed by combining multiple AEs sequentially. Their
goal is to learn only useful input features instead of learn-
ing the exact copy of the input. This technique is similar
to Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which finds a low-
dimensional representation of input data in an unsupervised
manner. The hidden layers of SAEs, which learn the impor-
tant features, have non-linear activation functions and their
weights are updated through the backpropagation algorithm.
With a Softmax layer as the final stage, SAEs derive output
labels and can thus be used for supervised learning.
2.3 Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
CNNs are a so-called Deep Learning technique. They have
received broad interest in the field of supervised learning, es-
pecially for complex tasks such as image and language clas-
sification [8, 28]. A typical CNN is made up of neurons,
which are interconnected and grouped into layers. Each neu-
ron computes a weighted sum of its inputs using a (non-)
linear activation function. Those inputs stem from the actual
inputs to the network or from previous layers. A typical CNN
comprises multiple layers of neurons, as shown in Figure 1:
Convolutional Layer. This layer is the core block of the
CNN. It consists of learnable filters that are slid over the
width and height of the input to learn any two-dimensional
patterns. The activation functions in the neurons thereby ex-
tract important features from each input. For efficiency, the
neurons are connected only to a local region of the input.
2
Figure 1: Typical structure of a CNN.
There are three hyper-parameters that control the behavior of
a Convolutional layer. The first one is called depth. It de-
fines the number of filters in the layer, which learn different
patterns in the input after every iteration. If all neurons in a
single depth have the same weights, the layer can be com-
puted as a convolution of the neurons’ weights. The second
parameter is the stride. It defines how fast the filters are
moved over the input. The most common stride value is 1,
which means the filters are moved by one feature at a time.
The last parameter is the zero-padding. The benefit of zero-
padding is to control the spatial size of the output, allowing
to match the input and output size of the layer.
Pooling Layer. After the Convolutional layer, networks
typically add a Pooling layer to reduce the spatial size of the
data representation. It helps to decrease the number of pa-
rameters and computation in the network, and also reduces
the risk of over-fitting. The Pooling layer resizes the input
spatially, using the max operation. Basically, the Pooling
layer applies a filter (typically 2×2) to the input and the max-
imum coefficient from every subregion is stored. Therefore,
only the most dominant features from the Convolution layer
are conveyed to the next layer.
Fully Connected/Dense Layer. After detecting high level
features in previous layers, a Dense layer is added to the end
of the network. The neurons in this layer are connected to all
the activations in the previous layer. Thus, additional rela-
tions between activations can be learned. If this layer is the
final one before the output, then a Loss layer is implemented.
In the Loss layer, the output size is set to 1×L, where L is the
number of predicated labels or classes. Then, the loss func-
tion is computed by using Softmax or Sigmoid cross-entropy
to evaluate the performance of the trained model. Finally,
the loss value is decreased by implementing a backpropaga-
tion algorithm that updates the weights in the previous lay-
ers. After the test data is classified, a probability estimate
(confidence ratio) is provided by the model. The probability
estimate indicates the confidence of the model for a predicted
class. For each class, a probability estimate is given and the
sum of all estimates equals to 1.
3 Inference Attack
This section discusses the threat model and the steps of our
proposed inference attack. Subsequently, details about our
cache profiling technique are given, including finding evic-
tion sets and post-processing measurements.
3.1 Threat Model
In our threat model, we assume that a mobile device user in-
stalls a malicious application from the Google Play store on
Android. Malicious Apps frequently offer benign function-
ality to disguise malicious background activities (e.g. hid-
den crypto currency mining). The malicious code needed
for our attack operates from user space and does not need
any App permissions. This means that we neither require
a rooted phone, nor ask the user for certain permissions, nor
rely on any exploits, e.g. to escalate privileges or to break out
of sandboxes. Furthermore, we do not rely on features that
might not be available on all Android phones. This includes
the use of memory pages that are larger than 4 KB. The sole
task of our malicious code is to profile the LLC and classify
victim activities with pre-trained ML/DL models. Once, the
LLC profiles have been gathered, the models are queried to
infer sensitive information.
3.2 Attack Outline
The proposed inference attack is conducted in two main
phases, the steps of which are visualized in Figure 2. In
the training phase, the attacker creates ML/DL models on a
training device that is similar to the target device. Most im-
portantly, the processor should be identical on both devices.
The ML/DL models are created by recording raw LLC pro-
files of target applications, websites, and videos, followed by
preparing the feature vectors, and training the ML/DL algo-
rithms with them. The trained models are then directly inte-
grated into the malicious application, which is subsequently
published in the App store. In the attack phase, the ma-
licious App prepares eviction sets for profiling the LLC on
the target device. Subsequently, the LLC sets are profiled
in a Prime+Probe manner and the feature vectors are ex-
tracted. Finally, the LLC profile is classified with the pre-
trained models to extract opened applications, websites, and
streamed videos. All steps of the attack phase are lightweight
and can be executed in the background without drawing no-
table attention.
3.3 Finding Eviction Sets
Once deployed, the first task of the malicious App is to find
eviction sets on the target device. An eviction set is essen-
tially a group of memory addresses that map to the same
cache set. Eviction sets are useful to profile the LLC and
therefore to capture the cache activity of other applications.
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Figure 2: Steps of the proposed inference attack.
A recent study by Vila et al. [50] investigates the problem
of finding eviction sets. The authors focus their evaluation
on Intel and do not further analyze ARM processors. In this
work, however, we target ARM-based mobile devices. Nev-
ertheless, the authors give a comprehensive overview of pre-
vious search algorithms and we therefore refer the interested
reader to this study for further information. Algorithms rele-
vant to this work are discussed in the paragraph below.
Lipp et al. [32] derive eviction sets from physical address
information which they obtain from the pagemap file that is
typically found under /proc/self/pagemap on Linux systems.
After their work was published, Android restricted the ac-
cess to pagemap entries from user space1. Liu et al. [34],
Irazoqui et al. [24], and Gruss et al. [15] rely on huge pages,
i.e. memory pages with typical sizes of > 1 MB, to obtain
those physical address bits that reveal the cache set num-
bers. Oren et al. [39] and Bosman et al. [4] rely on spe-
cial page allocation mechanisms in web browsers and oper-
ating systems that simplify the eviction set search. Genkin et
al. [12] build eviction sets from sandboxed code within a web
browser, while only relying on virtual address information.
Yet, they still require a precise and low-noise timing source
to distinguish cache hit and miss. In contrast to these previ-
ous works, we neither rely on physical address information
(whether obtained from pagemap, huge pages, or elsewhere),
nor on certain features of memory allocators, nor on a pre-
cise timing source. Our approach for finding eviction sets
is purely based on virtual addresses and robust against im-
precise and noisy timing sources. In addition, we found our
approach to be resilient against the random line replacement
policy implemented in many ARM processors. The major-
ity of previous work, except for [32], studied Intel and AMD
processors, which typically implement different replacement
policies.
Algorithm 1 outlines our dynamic timing test that at-
tributes memory addresses to cache sets. Prior to the test,
we assume that n memory pages have been requested and
are available as a memory pool. Note that we don’t pose any
1https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2016-03-01
Algorithm 1 Finding Eviction Sets.
1: T = {}
2: told = 0
3: for i from 1 to n do
4: add (T , i)
5: tT = access(T , r)
6: if (tT − told)> τ jump then
7: E ←{}
8: for all p in T do
9: tp = access(T \{p}, r)
10: if (tT − tp)> τ jump then
11: add (E , p)
12: end if
13: end for
14: report (E )
15: remove(T , E )
16: told = access(T , r)
17: else
18: told = tT
19: end if
20: end for
requirements on the memory page size, and as such, our al-
gorithm works with pages of 4 KB and smaller. Since we
want to evict the entire last-level cache, we need to choose
n such that the requested memory area is large enough to
fill it. In our experiments, we request a memory area that is
twice as large as the LLC. This turned out to be sufficient for
deriving all eviction sets. Algorithm 1 iterates over the allo-
cated memory pages in sequential order. Each unused page
is first added to a temporary eviction set T (line 4). Next,
the first byte of each page in T is accessed and the average
time tT of this access cycle is measured. The parameter r
determines how often the access cycle is repeated. In each
cycle, all pages in T are accessed once. The overall tim-
ing is then divided by r to obtain the average. This is useful
to account for different replacement policies and imprecise
timing sources. A detailed discussion of r is given later in
this section. The access time tT is then compared with the
time from the previous loop cycle (line 6), where T was one
page smaller. If the time difference is higher than a thresh-
old τ jump, then there is a systematic contention in a cache
set. In other words, the pages in T entirely fill one set and
cause a line replacement in the process. This is illustrated
in Figure 3(a), which shows the average access time tT over
an increasing number of pages in T . As long as no set con-
tention occurs, the average timings increase steadily. Once a
contention happens, the timing peaks. Each peak in the plot
indicates that one cache set is completely filled.
After a set contention is detected, Algorithm 1 iterates
over all pages in T , temporarily excludes them from T , ac-
cesses this reduced set, and stores the average access time in
tp (line 9). If the time difference between tT and tp is again
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(a) Average page access times, tT , for an increasing number of pages in T .
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(b) Average page access times, tp, used to filter an eviction set from T .
Figure 3: Plots of (a) tT and (b) tp, as used in Algorithm 1.
bigger than τ jump, then p belongs to the eviction set. This
is illustrated in Figure 3(b), which shows the average access
time tp for all candidate pages p in T . As soon as a candi-
date is part of the eviction set, the systematic set contention
vanishes and the access time tp drops. Each drop in the plot
therefore indicates a member of the eviction set. Those pages
are then added to the final eviction set E , which is reported
on line 14. The entries in E are subsequently removed from
T , before the outer loop continues to add unused pages to
T . Once the outer loop reaches n, we derive the eviction
sets for all LLC sets from the E that were reported by Algo-
rithm 1. The number of reported sets E is defined as m.
Eviction Set Derivation and Duplicates. Each reported
eviction set E contains a list of memory pages, of which the
first byte maps to the same cache set. But this is not all we
get from a given set E . Since one memory page typically
fits more than one cache line, we can derive multiple evic-
tions sets from one E . With 4 KB pages and 64-byte cache
lines, for example, there are 64 lines on one page. Since
memory pages are chunks of contiguous physical memory,
we know that those 64 lines belong to 64 consecutive cache
sets. Hence, we can derive 64 adjacent eviction sets from
one E (the first being E itself) by simply adding multiples of
64 to the start address of the pages. Depending on how large
we chose n, it can happen that Algorithm 1 reports multi-
Algorithm 2 Removing Duplicates.
1: F = {}
2: B = {1..m}
3: while notempty(B) do
4: f = pop(B)
5: for s inB do
6: tE = access
(
onepage
(
E f
)
+ Es, r
)
7: if (tE > τ jump) then
8: remove(B, s)
9: end if
10: end for
11: add (F , f )
12: end while
ple eviction sets that map to the same cache sets. We there-
fore need to check all reported sets for duplicates and remove
them. This procedure is outlined in Algorithm 2. It starts by
storing the indices of all m reported eviction sets from Al-
gorithm 1 in the list B for bookkeeping (line 2). As long
as B is not empty, the first index is removed and assigned
to f (line 4). The algorithm then iterates over all remain-
ing indices s and accesses the corresponding eviction sets E f
and Es. In particular, one page in E f and all pages in Es are
accessed consecutively, and the whole process is repeated r
times. If the average timing tE of these access cycles is larger
than a threshold τ jump, then E f and Es map to the same cache
set. If this happens, the affected index s is removed fromB
(line 8), and the iteration continues. After all eviction sets
have been tested, the index in f is added to the final list F
(line 11). With each loop, B is shrinking as duplicate evic-
tion sets are removed. OnceB is empty,F contains the list
of unique eviction set indices.
Timer Precision and Noise. Both algorithms 1 and 2 are
designed to compensate imprecise and noisy timing sources.
Although previous work [12, 43] suggests that accurate
timers can be crafted even in environments that restrict ac-
cess to high-precision timing sources, this engineering effort
can be saved for our inference attack. We believe this adds to
the practicality of our attack and shows that inference attacks
are a realistic threat. The precision and noise compensation
in our algorithms is done by tuning the parameter r, as well
as the threshold τ jump. r defines the number of access cy-
cles, i.e., how often a selection of memory pages is accessed.
τ jump defines how the timing of these access cycles should
be evaluated. In Algorithm 1, the accesses on line 5 will
typically cause cache hits until the gathered pages trigger a
systematic set contention. The difference between tT and
told will therefore be in the order of tmiss, where tmiss is the
duration of a cache miss. Similarly, the accesses on line 9
will cause cache hits, if the candidate page p is part of the
eviction set. In this case, the difference between tT and tp
will again be around tmiss. Therefore, τ jump can initially be
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set slightly smaller than tmiss and adjusted based on experi-
mental data. The choice of r depends on the precision of the
timer and the measurement quality. In general, r should be
set such that r · tmiss is larger than the precision of the timer.
It can be increased further, if high levels of noise are encoun-
tered, e.g., due to random line replacement. The choices for
τ jump and r also hold for Algorithm 2, where the accesses on
line 6 will typically cause cache hits until E f and Es are du-
plicates. When this happens, a systematic set contention will
occur, as the chosen page from E f will be evicted by Es. In
our experiments, we set r between 900 and 1000, and τ jump
to 500. The timer available on our test device provides a pre-
cision of 52 ns. Although this resolution would not require
large values for r, we also need to compensate the random
replacement policy that is implemented on our target device.
Line Replacement Policies. The parameter r causes repet-
itive accesses to cache lines. This signals the cache controller
that the accessed lines are of heightened interest and should
not be replaced. For least-recently-used (LRU) replacement
policies, this is obviously beneficial, as unrelated cache ac-
tivity will less likely interfere with the eviction set finding.
But also random replacement policies benefit, because aver-
aging over r access cycles attenuates the effect of unintended
line replacements that happen due to random line selection.
Our experiments outlined in Section 4 show that the selection
of r as stated above is sufficient to compensate the effects of
the random line replacement used on our test device.
Implementation and Limitations. Only few requirements
have to be satisfied to find eviction sets with our approach.
Memory must be allocated and accessed, and the accesses
must be timed. Memory pages can be of arbitrary size
and the timing source can be coarse-grained. This allows
our algorithm to be implemented in user space, and thus
in a plethora of environments, including desktop computers,
cloud servers, and mobile devices. Even sandboxes and vir-
tual machines are typically no obstacle, enabling remote at-
tacks, e.g., from JavaScript. The limitation of our approach
is that we don’t know the exact mapping of eviction sets to
cache sets. We only know that we have one eviction set for
each existing cache set. However, this is not a deficiency of
our approach, but a direct consequence of not using physical
address information. This choice makes our approach more
practical and, thanks to the application of advanced ML/DL
techniques, still allows successful inference attacks.
Performance. We evaluated algorithms 1 and 2 on our test
device, a Nexus 5X, with the parameters stated above. The
targeted LLC is 2 MB in size and 16-way set-associative. It
implements a random replacement policy and features 64-
byte cache lines. Requested memory pages have a standard
size of 4 KB. Based on 1000 evaluation runs, algorithms 1
and 2 successfully yield all eviction sets with an average run-
time of 20 seconds. Note that during our inference attack,
eviction sets must be found only once and remain unchanged
until the malicious App is restarted.
3.4 Profiling the Last-level Cache
We profile the cache activity in the LLC using the unique
eviction sets that we obtain from algorithms 1 and 2. For
each E , we derive all adjacent eviction sets and use them to
Prime+Probe [48] the corresponding cache sets. We thereby
group observations of multiple cache sets, which we call vir-
tual cache sets. Each virtual cache set consists of multiple
individual cache sets that all belong to one E and its derived
eviction sets. Accordingly, these individual cache sets are
called physical cache sets. As stated earlier, the exact order
in which eviction sets map to physical cache sets is unknown.
Yet, one virtual cache set comprises a number of consecutive
physical cache sets. To profile a virtual cache set, we fill
(prime) it with the eviction sets, before re-filling (probe) it
a second time immediately afterwards. The time it takes to
probe reflects the activity of other applications in the virtual
cache set. In general, high levels of activity will increase
the probing time, whereas low levels will decrease it. Each
probing time constitutes a measurement sample of the virtual
cache set. The LLC profile then consists of the measurement
samples for all available virtual cache sets.
3.5 Post-processing and Feature Vectors
The measured LLC profiles are post-processed before being
classified by the ML/DL algorithms. For the explanation,
we assume that each LLC profile contains nT measurement
samples per virtual cache set. The following list outlines the
steps, the last of which is applied to only one feature vector.
• Eliminate timing outliers with a threshold (τO). All out-
liers are omitted in the subsequent analysis by replacing
them with the sample median. In our experiments, τO is
set to 5 µs .
• Convert timing samples to binary representation. A
threshold (τH ) decides whether a sample value is low
or high. In our experiments, τH is set to 750 ns.
• Compress samples by grouping high values. All bursts
of consecutive high timing samples are reduced to one
high value.
• Transform measurement samples into the frequency do-
main using a fast Fourier transformation (FFT). This
has shown to be a simple, yet effective way to com-
pensate noise in the measurements [19, 39].
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After the post-processing steps, we extract meaningful fea-
ture vectors from the measurement samples, before feeding
everything to the ML/DL algorithms. In total, we derive
three different feature vectors that are outlined in the follow-
ing paragraphs. While the first two are based on profiling
virtual cache sets, the last one is based on profiling physi-
cal (i.e. individual) cache sets. This feature vector is used to
evaluate the performance of our inference attack in Section 4.
Virtual Cache Sets. In this case, the feature vector con-
tains the number of high samples for each virtual cache set.
The size of the feature vector is therefore at most nT × the
number of virtual cache sets.
Virtual Cache Sets + FFT. In this case, the last post-
processing step, the Fourier transformation, is applied to
the measurement samples in addition. The sampling rate
nS is derived by dividing 1 second by the duration of one
Prime+Probe cycle. For nT samples, the FFT yields nT2 com-
ponents, excluding the DC component. This is because the
FFT is symmetrical. For each virtual cache set, we compute
the FFT of all corresponding physical cache sets individu-
ally, and then group these components into n f f t bins by sum-
ming up their absolute bin values. Thus, each virtual cache
set yields n f f t frequency components. The overall feature
vector size is therefore n f f t × the number of virtual cache
sets.
Physical Cache Sets. In this case, the feature vector con-
tains the number of high samples for each individual LLC
set. The cache sets are thereby profiled individually and
in order, according to their cache set index. This requires
the knowledge of physical address information, and thus a
stronger attacker model than the one we assume for our in-
ference attack. Consequently, the feature vector is only used
in a comparison attack, with which we evaluate the success
of our proposed inference attack. The size of the feature vec-
tor is at most nT × the number of physical cache sets.
3.6 Attack Evaluation
As stated above, we evaluate our proposed inference attack
by comparing it to a more powerful attack. In particular,
we implement the inference attack with elevated privileges
(e.g. root), which allow to query precise timers and obtain
exact cache set indices of profiled sets. The eviction sets are
derived using physical address information from pagemap
entries, instead of using algorithms 1 and 2. This allows to
attribute eviction sets to physical cache sets and enables fine-
grained LLC profiling. Consequently, the comparison attack
profiles individual cache sets in ascending order and thereby
captures application activity with high resolution. In the rest
of the paper, this attack is called comparison attack.
4 Experiment Setup and Results
This section provides details about our experiment setup, in-
cluding our target device and ML/DL parameter selection.
Subsequently, the results of the attack evaluation are pre-
sented and discussed. In total, we conduct three experiments,
in which our malicious App detects applications (1), identi-
fies visited websites (2), and infers streamed videos (3). The
classification rates in all experiments are based on the most
likely label.
4.1 Target Device and ML Testing
The target device in our experiments is a Google Nexus 5X
with Android v8.0.0. It features four ARM Cortex-A53 and
two ARM Cortex-A57 processor cores. The malicious code
runs on one of the A57 cores and profiles the last-level cache
in the background. The target applications are launched and
transition automatically to the A57 processor cluster. This
is because the scheduler assigns resource-hungry processes
(e.g. browser or multimedia applications) to the A57 cores
to leverage their high performance. During all experiments,
the system was connected to the campus wireless network
and background processes from the Android OS and other
Apps were running. The timing source in our malicious App
is the POSIX clock_gettime system call, which is available
on most Linux systems as well as on Android. The inferred
applications, websites, and videos are listed in Appendix A.
For website inference, we run Google Chrome and for video
inference, we run Netflix and Youtube2.
SVM and SAE classification is implemented with the help
of LibSVM [6], whereas CNN classification is done using
custom Keras [10] scripts together with the Tensorflow [1]
GPU backend. The CNN is trained on a workstation with
two Nvidia 1080Ti (Pascal) GPUs, a 20-core Intel i7-7900X
CPU, and 64 GB of RAM. For all classifiers, 90% of the
measured LLC profiles are selected randomly for the train-
ing phase, while the rest of the data is chosen to evaluate
the efficiency of the trained models. This 10% holdout ap-
proach yields the classification accuracies that are presented
in the subsequent sections. Throughout the experiments, we
observed that 10-fold cross-validation results are consistent
with a 10% holdout approach. In total, we collected more
than 800 GB of cache profiling data to evaluate our inference
attack.
4.2 ML/DL Parameter Selection
The following paragraphs provide the parameter selection of
the ML/DL techniques and further details about their usage.
2Chrome v64.0.3282.137, Netflix v6.16.0, Youtube v13.36.50
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SVM. Physical and virtual cache set feature vectors are
classified with a linear SVM, while the virtual cache set
+ FFT feature vector is classified with a non-linear SVM.
This is because the FFT is computed with non-linear func-
tions (cos, sin) and the labels are linearly increasing for the
classes. Therefore, a non-linear SVM is chosen to classify
the FFT components. The superior performance of a non-
linear SVM is verified in preliminary experiments. Similarly,
we determine that the linear kernel type outperforms radial
basis and polynomial options for virtual cache set and virtual
cache set + FFT feature vectors.
SAE. The two hidden layers of the SAE comprise 250 and
50 neurons, respectively. The maximum number of epochs
is set to 400, since no improvements can be observed after-
wards. We decrease the effect of over-fitting by setting the
L2 weight regularization parameter to 0.01. The output layer
is a Softmax layer.
CNN. The construction of the CNN follows the structure
illustrated in Figure 1, Section 2. The CNN consists of two
1-D Convolution layers that are followed by MaxPooling,
Dropout, as well as Flatten and Dense layers. The selection
of the layer parameters is done with the help of preliminary
experiments. Table 6 in Appendix A shows the parameter
space that we explored. Eventually, we selected the param-
eters that yielded the lowest validation loss (highlighted in
bold). The size of the first 1-D Convolution layer is varied
from 8 to 1024. The highest classification rate is obtained
with a size of 512. Similarly, the size of the second Convolu-
tion layer is varied between 32 and 256, and eventually fixed
to 256. A third Convolution layer does not improve the clas-
sification. The activation function in the Convolution layers
is set to Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU). The size of the sub-
sequent MaxPooling layer is varied from 2 to 8. The default
size of 2 yields the best results. The dropout of the following
Dropout layer is varied between 0.1 and 0.5, and finally set
to 0.2. A higher dropout, as for example used in computer
vision, adversely affects the classification. Next, the kernel
size is adjusted, and out of the values between 3 and 27, a
size of 9 achieves the highest success rates. A Flatten layer
shapes the data in our network, before a Dense layer of size
200 is appended. The activation function of the Dense layer
is set to hyperbolic tangent (tanh). Finally, we employ a set
of standard choices: the kernel initializers are chosen uni-
formly at random, an Adam optimizer is used to speed up
the training phase, and the batch size is set to 50, as its effect
on the classification rate is negligible.
4.3 Evaluation Results
The following sub-sections present the evaluation results for
application, website, and video inference.
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Figure 4: Classification results for application inference over
an increasing number of LLC profiles for (a) Physical Cache
Sets, (b) Virtual Cache Sets, and (c) Virtual Cache Sets +
FFT feature vectors.
4.3.1 Application Inference
For the application inference attack, we profile 100 random
mobile applications from the Google Play Store, including
dating, political, and spy Apps. The full list is given in Ta-
ble 4 in Appendix A. The first 70 applications are used to
train the ML/DL models, while the remaining 30 Apps are
treated as unknown Apps. Each App is started and profiled
for 1.5 seconds as described in Section 3. Within this time
frame, we collect nT = 96,000 measurement samples per vir-
tual cache set. For the FFT computation, the sampling rate
nS = 1.9MHz and the number of bins n f f t = 15.
A first comparison of ML/DL techniques and feature vec-
tors is given in Figure 4. It contains three sub-plots that
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Figure 5: Average receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves for SVM, SAE, CNN during application inference.
each show the classification results of SVM, SAE, and CNN
over an increasing number of recorded LLC profiles. 90% of
the recorded profiles are used for training, whereas the rest
is used to obtain the classification rates shown in the plots.
Note that in practice, recording one LLC profile on the target
device is sufficient to conduct a successful inference attack.
Plot 4(a) illustrates the results of the comparison attack,
which is based on the physical cache set feature vector. The
fine-grained LLC profiles allow all three classifiers to distin-
guish applications with high confidence. CNN even achieves
a classification rate of 97%. Plot 4(b) shows that classifi-
cation rates drop, if the LLC profiles are based on virtual
cache sets. SAE even falls down to 80%, while CNN remains
above 90%. The CNN that we designed is therefore least af-
fected by the simplified profiling technique of our inference
attack. The classification rates improve again, if the LLC
profiles are transformed with an FFT, as shown in Plot 4(c).
In particular, CNN and SAE benefit from this transforma-
tion, while SVM cannot fully leverage the information in the
frequency spectrum. Our CNN reaches a classification rate
of 97.8% and is thereby able to fully close the gap to the
comparison attack.
A further performance metric for the three ML/DL tech-
niques is shown in Figure 5. It displays the receiver operat-
ing characteristic (ROC) curves for the virtual cache set +
FFT feature vector. The area under the curve (AUC) values
are given in the plot legend. The higher the AUC, the less
the ML/DL technique suffers from false positives. While all
three classifiers produce low false positive rates, CNN out-
performs SVM and SAE. Based on the results of the appli-
cation detection, we conclude that CNN is the most suitable
classifier for our inference attack. For website and video in-
ference, we will therefore only present the CNN results. The
results of the other classifiers can be found in Appendix A.
Unknown Applications. The inherent nature of super-
vised learning is to recognize events that are similar to those
used in the training phase. In practice, however, events may
occur that the model has never been trained with. This also
Figure 6: Probability estimates from the Softmax layer of
our CNN while classifying known and unknown Apps.
applies to our inference attack. Naturally, we cannot train
our models with all existing applications on the App store.
In fact, we want to focus only on Apps that are of interest.
Hence, we need a way to recognize and filter Apps we have
not trained yet. We achieve this by monitoring the probabil-
ity estimates obtained from the Softmax layer. Recall that we
train only 70 Apps out of the 100 that are given in Table 4 in
Appendix A. When we classify all 100 Apps on our target de-
vice, we obtain the probability estimates shown in Figure 6.
All known Apps yield a high probability estimate close to 1,
whereas unknown Apps yield estimates that are significantly
lower. We thus label each classification that yields a proba-
bility estimate below a threshold to be unknown. By setting
this threshold to 0.84 in our experiments, we obtain false
positive and false negative rates of 3% and 1%, respectively.
With this approach, our inference attack works reliably, even
if unknown applications are used on the target device.
4.3.2 Website Inference
The results in the previous section illustrate that our mali-
cious App can reliably detect running applications with high
confidence. Once a browser is detected, it is possible to infer
the websites that are currently viewed. We demonstrate this
by profiling the LLC while visiting 100 different websites in
Google Chrome. The list of websites is given in Table 5 in
Appendix A. To emphasize that browsing histories are sen-
sitive information, the list includes news, social media, po-
litical, and dating websites. For each website, we profile the
LLC for 1.5 seconds and again obtain nT = 96,000 samples
per virtual cache set. The features vectors are constructed in
the same way as for application detection.
Figure 7 shows the classification results for our CNN and
all three feature vectors over an increasing number of LLC
profiles. Similar to application inference, the frequency
transform of virtual cache set profiles matches and slightly
overshoots the results of the comparison attack that is based
on physical cache sets. With a classification rate of 86%,
the CNN is able to infer viewed websites with satisfactory
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Figure 7: Classification results for website inference over
an increasing number of LLC profiles for Physical (solid),
Virtual (dotted), and Virtual Cache Set + FFT (dashed).
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Figure 8: Average receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves for SVM, SAE, CNN during website inference.
confidence. The classification rate is lower compared to ap-
plication inference, because loading and rendering websites
leaves a weaker footprint in the LLC than opening Apps.
The ROC curves for the virtual cache set + FFT feature
vector are shown in Figure 8. The AUC values in the plot
legend again illustrate that our CNN yields the lowest num-
ber of false positives. This classifier and feature vector com-
bination is the best choice for website inference.
Unknown Websites. As previously, we train the CNN
with only 70 websites and subsequently classify all 100 web-
sites from Table 5. The probability estimates of the Softmax
layer are similar to the application inference and therefore
not shown here. For a threshold of 0.74, we obtain false pos-
itive and false negative rates of 16% and 3%, respectively.
The inference attack is thus sufficiently robust against en-
countering unknown websites during profiling.
4.3.3 Video Inference
In addition to websites, we also infer videos that are being
streamed in the Netflix and Youtube applications. We pro-
file a total of 20 videos, which are given in Table 3 in Ap-
pendix A. In contrast to previous evaluations, we increase
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Figure 9: Classification results for video inference over an
increasing number of LLC profiles for Physical (solid), Vir-
tual (dotted), and Virtual Cache Set + FFT (dashed).
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Figure 10: Average receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves for SVM, SAE, CNN during video inference.
the profiling phase to 6 seconds. This is because the LLC
footprint of videos is less distinct compared to applications
and websites. Within the extended profiling phase, we col-
lect nT = 384,000 samples per virtual cache set. For the
FFT computation, the number of bins n f f t is increased to 60.
Due to the high number of feature values, the size of the first
Convolution layer in our CNN is increased to 1024. The rest
of the feature vectors are constructed in the same way as for
application and website inference.
Figure 9 shows the classification results for our CNN and
all three feature vectors over an increasing number of LLC
profiles. The FFT over the virtual cache sets again matches
the comparison attack, but eventually falls behind by 10%.
With a classification rate of 80%, our inference attack is able
to infer streamed videos with moderate success. We believe
that the LLC profiles do not contain enough information to
distinguish multiple videos, as video processing is a rather
homogeneous task. In addition, parts of the video decoding
are typically outsourced to the GPU, which further reduces
the cache footprint. Regarding the ROC curves, which are
shown in Figure 10, our CNN again outperforms SVM and
SAE, with SVM not falling far behind. Due to the reduced
success rate for video classification, we skipped the evalua-
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tion of unknown videos. Yet, we expect them to follow the
same trend as for application and website inference.
4.3.4 Discussion
The previous sections show that modern machine learning
techniques enable successful inference attacks even when
simple cache profiling methods are employed. Throughout
our experiments, frequency-domain transforms of coarse-
grained LLC profiles yield high success rates when classi-
fied with Convolutional Neural Networks. This classifica-
tion closely matches and sometimes outperforms the fine-
grained comparison attack that is based on a more powerful
attacker. The FFT thereby reduces the noise in the measure-
ments, while the shift invariance of CNNs compensates the
lacking order in which LLC sets are profiled. The limit of our
inference attack becomes apparent when the LLC activity is
less distinct or faints. While applications and websites can
reliably be inferred, the accuracy drops for video classifica-
tion. This could be improved by increasing the profiling time
or including other side-channels such as GPU activity. Nev-
ertheless, the results clearly indicate that a carefully crafted
and well-trained CNN enables inference attacks that are ro-
bust, easy to implement, and therefore practical.
5 Related Work
The attack presented in this paper relates to previous work in
the areas of website and application inference, cache attacks
on ARM-based systems, and machine learning in the context
of side-channel attacks (SCAs). The following sub-sections
discuss the relations to these areas in more detail.
5.1 Website and Application Inference
In literature, the inference of visited websites has been in-
vestigated from many perspectives. Server-side website in-
ference has been proposed through caching [11] and render-
ing [31] of website elements, visited URL styles [25], user
interactions [51], quota management [27], and shared event
loops [49]. Panchenko et al. [40] use traffic analysis to de-
tect visited websites in the Tor network. Zhang et al. [53]
exploit iOS APIs to infer visited websites and running appli-
cations on mobile platforms. Spreitzer et al. [45, 46] obtain
distinct features from the procfs filesystem and use Android
APIs to infer opened web pages and applications. Lee et
al. [29] exploit uninitialized GPU memory pages to detect
websites, while Naghibijouybari et al. [38] exploit OpenGL
APIs and GPU performance counters for this task. Gulme-
zoglu et al. [20] show that hardware performance events on
modern processors give distinct features for websites visited
in Google Chrome and Tor browsers. Diao et al. [9] infer ap-
plication information through system interrupts. Jana and
Shmatikov [26] demonstrate that websites leave a distinct
memory footprint in the browser application. Hornby [22]
shows that this footprint can be observed from a malicious
application via the processor cache. Oren et al. [39] as well
as Gruss et al. [14] demonstrate that opened websites and
their individual elements can be inferred from cache obser-
vations taken from a malicious JavaScript applet.
Shusterman et al. [44] extend this work by inferring web-
sites from JavaScript with simple last-level cache profiles
that are classified by Convolutional Neural Networks and
Long Short-Term Memory. As this is concurrent work to
ours3, we provide a closer comparison later in the section.
Gulmezoglu et al. [19] use cache observations to detect run-
ning applications in co-located virtual machines. In this
work, we also use measurements of cache activity to infer
running applications, visited websites, and streamed videos.
The comparison of our results with other attacks is given in
Table 1. For website classification, GPU-, network traffic-,
and operating system-based attacks achieve higher success
rates than our inference attack. In contrast to these attacks,
we don’t need access to GPU, network, or OS APIs, which
can be restricted or easily monitored. We rely on simple
memory accesses and coarse-grained timing measurements,
which are difficult to restrict and monitor. Compared to the
LLC-based attack in [39], our success rates are higher, even
though we classify significantly more websites. Compared
to the results by Shusterman et al. [44], we achieve similar
classification rates. At the same time, we relax the attacker
model by not only compensating imprecise timing sources
but also random cache replacement policies. For application
detection, the success rate of our approach is, to the best of
our knowledge, the highest one in literature.
Comparison with Shusterman et al. In [44], the authors
present a similar inference attack than the one proposed in
this work. The LLC profiling is implemented with so-called
one-dimensional memorygrams. Essentially, this is a buffer
as large as the LLC, which is repeatedly accessed. The time
to access the entire buffer then relates to the activity in the
LLC and is used to infer websites. In contrast, we build evic-
tion sets and group them to profile contiguous parts of the
LLC. This provides a more fine-grained view on the activ-
ity in the LLC. Shusterman et al. profile the LLC for 30
seconds, while we achieve our results with a profiling phase
of 1.5 seconds. The authors further choose their CNN pa-
rameters based on the success rate, while we select the pa-
rameters based on validation loss. Using the validation loss
makes the training model more robust, because success rates
increase with over-fitting. The differences in parameter se-
lection are essentially the number of Convolution layers, the
kernel size, and the Pooling size. We trained our model with
2 Convolution layers, which yield a lower validation loss
compared to 3 layers. The kernel size is kept the same in
3Published on Nov. 17th: https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.07153.
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Table 1: Comparison of website and application inference attacks.
Scenario Attack Attack Vector Accuracy (%) # of Classes
Websites
This work Last-level Cache (LLC) 85.8 70
[39] LLC 82.1 8
[44] LLC 86.1 100
[20] CPU Performance Events 84.0 30
[38] GPU Performance Events 93.0 200
[29] Uninitialized GPU Memory Pages 95.4 100
[26] Scheduling Statistics 78.0 100
[49] Shared Event Loops 76.7 500
[40] Traffic Analysis 92.5 100
[53] iOS APIs 68.5 100
[46] Java-based Android API 89.4 20
[45] ProcFS Leaks 94.0 20
Applications
This work LLC 97.8 70
[19] LLC 78.5 40
[53] iOS APIs 89.0 120
[46] Java-based Android API 85.6 20
[9] Interrupt Handling Mechanism 87.0 100
[45] ProcFS Leaks 96.0 100
each Convolution layer, while in [44] it is varied with each
layer. Finally, we use a Pooling size of 2, while Shuster-
man et al. use 4. One reason for these differences is that we
incorporated the results by Prouff et al. [41] in addition to
conducting preliminary experiments. The classification rates
for Google Chrome in [44] are comparable to the ones we
achieve. In summary, both Shusterman et al. and this work
propose inference attacks that share a common goal, but dif-
fer regarding approach and attack environment. In [44] the
attack was launched from JavaScript on Intel CPUs, while
we conducted our attacks on Android and ARM. Yet, the
achieved classification rates are similar. We believe this em-
phasizes that inference attacks of this kind are a practical,
cross-platform attack that need to be addressed, if we want
to safeguard user privacy in the long-term.
5.2 Cache Attacks on ARM
In the past, the field of cache attacks has been predominantly
focused on x86 processors. Most attacks known today ei-
ther use dedicated flush instructions [18, 52, 16] or targeted
thrashing of cache sets [48, 17, 24, 34, 12] to manipulate
and observe the processor cache. These techniques have
initially been demonstrated on ARM processors by Lipp et
al. [32]. In contrast to Intel x86, ARM processors com-
plicate attacks with random replacement policies, exclusive
and non-inclusive cache hierarchies, and internal line lock-
ing mechanisms [13]. In this work, we show that despite
these challenges, simple observations of the last-level cache
are sufficient to infer user activity on ARM-based mobile
devices. Unlike previous work, we pair these simple ob-
servations with advanced machine learning techniques and
thereby overcome the attack difficulties on ARM processors.
Comparison with Lipp et al. In [32], the authors per-
form multiple cache attacks on ARM devices, including
Prime+Probe [48], the attack technique employed in this
work. For this reason, we conducted an evaluation that com-
pares the Prime+Probe technique by Lipp et al. to ours. In
particular, we set up an experiment, in which we try to clas-
sify the first 20 websites from Table 5 in Appendix A. We ob-
tain the Prime+Probe code from the GitHub repository [33]
by Lipp et al., and run the eviction strategy evaluator on our
test device. The strategy 22-1-6 yields the highest eviction
rate of 98% on our ARM Cortex-A57. The code by Lipp et
al. uses pagemap entries to find eviction sets (thus requiring
root privileges), while we employ algorithms 1 and 2 that
work without privileges. The profiling phase for the website
classification is 1.5 seconds. We collect 800 LLC profiles for
each website, and use 90% as training data and the rest as test
data. For the comparison, we derive the physical cache set
and virtual cache set + FFT feature vectors, as described in
Section 3. We omit the virtual cache set feature vector, as it
yielded lower accuracies than the other ones throughout our
experiments. Table 2 shows the obtained classification rates
based on the CNN classifier.
Table 2: Classification rates comparison using CNN.
Feature Lipp et al. This Work
Physical 90% 93%
Virtual + FFT 85% 94%
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While classification rates are close when profiling individual
cache sets, our approach achieves a higher success rate for
virtual cache sets. We believe this is because our eviction sets
are smaller and therefore more resilient against background
cache activity during the profiling. In summary, our profiling
technique achieves higher classification rates while requiring
no root privileges to find eviction sets.
5.3 Machine Learning and SCAs
Side-channel attacks (SCAs) typically rely on signal pro-
cessing and statistics to infer information from observa-
tions. This closely relates them to machine learning tech-
niques. In 2002, template attacks [5, 7] were first intro-
duced, which use Naive Bayes classifiers to match leakage
signals on training and target devices. Since 2011, more
advanced machine learning approaches were introduced to
side-channel literature [23]. Lerman et al. [30] use Random
Forests (RFs), SVMs, and Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to
analyze a 3DES implementation and to compare the effec-
tiveness of ML techniques against template attacks. Later,
Heuser et al. [21] applied multi-class SVMs to classify multi-
bit values, pointing out that SVM-based analysis is more
robust against noisy environments than classical template
attacks. In the same year, Zhang et al. [54] showed that
multi-class SVMs can be used in combination with Hidden
Markov Models (HMMs) to recover RSA decryption keys
from cache traces in a cloud environment. Gulmezoglu et
al. [19] showed that SVM-based approaches can be used to
extract features from FFT components obtained from LLC
traces. Even though SVM can perform better than template
attacks, the main problem with SVM is the choice of regu-
larization and kernel parameters, which is slow and costly.
In addition, when the number of features increases, find-
ing meaningful boundaries gets more difficult in a non-linear
scenario. Neural Networks (NN) have also been introduced
to side-channel attacks. Martinasek et al. [37, 36] showed
that basic NN techniques can recover AES keys with a 96%
success rate. With the increasing popularity of Deep Learn-
ing, corresponding techniques were also studied in SCAs. In
2014, Zheng et al. [55] used CNNs to classify time series
data with high accuracy. In 2015, Beltramelli [3] introduced
Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM), a special DL technique,
to classify 12 different keypads obtained from smart watch
motion sensors. In 2016, Maghrebi et al. [35] compared
four DL-based techniques (AE, CNN, LSTM and MLP) with
template attacks while attacking an unprotected AES imple-
mentation using power consumption. The results indicated
that CNNs outperform template attacks thanks to their ad-
vanced feature extraction capability. In 2017, Schuster et
al. [42] showed that encrypted streams can be used to clas-
sify videos with CNNs. In the same year, Gulmezoglu et
al. [20] used hardware performance events to classify web-
sites visited on a personal computer using SVM and CNN
techniques.
Comparison with Prouff et al. It is important to follow
a systematic approach when choosing parameters of CNNs.
Prouff et al. [41] studied the parameter selection of MLP and
CNN in the context of side-channel attacks. There are in to-
tal 4 rules to follow according to their work. The first rule
states that Convolution layers have the same configuration in
the same block. The second rule is that Pooling layers have
a dimension of 2. The third rule is that the number of filters
in a Convolution layer is higher than those of the previous
layer. The fourth rule states that all Convolution layers have
the same kernel size. While we implement rules 1, 2 and 4,
rule number 3 does not apply to our experiments. Instead,
the number of filters decreases for each Convolution layer.
In addition, we do not exhaustively explore batch sizes and
optimization methods, since they do not significantly affect
validation loss in our case. During kernel size selection, we
found that higher kernel sizes give better results, which is the
opposite of the findings in [41]. Since we are not conduct-
ing classical side-channel attacks, we evaluate our parame-
ters based on the validation loss, while Prouff et al. find the
best parameters based on the mean rank of the key classes.
6 Conclusion
Inference attacks undermine our privacy by revealing our
most secret interests, preferences, and attitudes. Unfortu-
nately, modern processors, which constitute the core of our
digital infrastructure, are particularly vulnerable to these at-
tacks. Footprints in the processor cache allow the infer-
ence of running applications, visited websites, and streamed
videos. Above all, the advances in machine learning, espe-
cially the concepts behind deep learning, significantly lower
the bar of successfully implementing inference attacks. Our
work demonstrates that it is possible to execute an inference
attack without privileges, permissions, or access to special
programming interfaces and peripherals. The simple nature
of the attack code renders a detection on the target device
next to impossible. This simplicity is paired with the careful
application of deep learning. Interferences such as measure-
ment noise, misalignment, or unknown and unfavorable pro-
cessor features are thereby conveniently compensated. The
comparison with concurrent work furthermore indicates that
inference attacks of this kind are ubiquitous and succeed
across runtime environments and processing hardware. For
applications that value the privacy of their users, protection
against inference attacks must thus be deployed in a timely
manner. A comprehensive solution, however, seems to re-
quire a closer collaboration between hardware manufactur-
ers, operating system designers, and application developers.
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A Appendix
This section provides additional results regarding our experi-
ments. It lists the profiled applications, websites, and videos,
and gives the parameters that were explored while construct-
ing our Convolutional Neural Network.
A.1 Website Inference
Figure 11 contains three sub-plots that each show the classi-
fication results of SVM, SAE, and CNN over an increasing
number of recorded LLC profiles. Similar to application in-
ference, the classifiers are able to leverage the fine-grained
information contained in the physical cache set feature vec-
tor. While success rates drop for the virtual cache set feature
vector, they recover for the virtual cache set + FFT feature
vector. In all three cases, the Convolutional Neural Network
achieves the best classification rates.
A.2 Video Inference
A similar trend can be observed in Figure 12. While the
physical cache set feature vector allows confident classifi-
cation, success drops significantly for virtual cache sets. In
contrast to application and website inference, the classifica-
tion rates do not fully recover for the virtual cache set + FFT
feature vector. As discussed in Section 4, the LLC footprints
while viewing different videos are not distinct enough to con-
fidently infer them in this case.
A.3 Profiled Applications, Websites, Videos
Table 3 lists the videos that are profiled in our experiments.
Youtube videos are chosen from the list of most watched
videos on Youtube. Trailers and recaps viewed in the Net-
flix App are from the series The House of Cards.
Table 3: List of profiled videos.
Youtube (left) and Netflix (right) Videos
1) Despacito 1) Season 1 Trailer
2) See You Again 2) Season 2 Trailer
3) Shape of You 3) Season 3 Trailer
4) Gangnam Style 4) Season 4 Trailer
5) Uptown Funk 5) Season 5 Trailer
6) Sorry 6) Season 1 Recap
7) Sugar 7) Season 2 Recap
8) Shake it Off 8) Season 3 Recap
9) Roar 9) Season 4 Recap
10) Bailando 10) Season 1 Trailer (Extended)
Tables 4 and 5 list the profiled applications and websites.
Websites are thereby taken from the Alexa ranking [2].
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Figure 11: Classification results for website inference over
an increasing number of LLC profiles for (a) Physical Cache
Sets, (b) Virtual Cache Sets, and (c) Virtual Cache Sets +
FFT feature vectors.
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Figure 12: Classification results for video inference over an
increasing number of LLC profiles for (a) Physical Cache
Sets, (b) Virtual Cache Sets, and (c) Virtual Cache Sets +
FFT feature vectors.
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Table 4: List of profiled applications.
Applications
1) Spotify 35) Reddit 69) OurTime
2) Snapchat 36) Imdb 70) HowAboutWe
3) Instagram 37) Creditkarma 71) Tiktok
4) Facebook 38) Alexa 72) Canva
5) Youtube 39) Yahoo 73) Autolist
6) Chrome 40) Starz 74) Sephora
7) Netflix 41) Zedge 75) Indeed
8) Uber 42) Textnow 76) Marvel
9) Twitter 43) Soundcloud 77) Hinge
10) Bitmoji 44) Booking 78) Daylio
11) Google Drive 45) Duolingo 79) Roku
12) Pandora 46) Tinder 80) Investing
13) NY Times 47) Joom 81) Ifood
14) Pinterest 48) Xbox 82) Fitbit
15) Lyft 49) Shazam 83) Goodrx
16) InBrowser 50) Chase 84) Fastnews
17) Firefox Focus 51) Huffington 85) Touchnote
18) Orfox 52) Breitbart 86) Nike
19) Musical Focus 53) Earspy 87) Sony
20) Wish 54) Ispy 88) Kayak
21) Hulu 55) Spycamera 89) Expedia
22) Workout 56) Mspy 90) Sketch
23) Waze 57) Secretagent 91) PlutoTV
24) Walmart 58) Politico 92) Grubhub
25) Wholefoods 59) TheHill 93) McDonald’s
26) Dairy Queen 60) Dailykos 94) Target
27) Discord 61) Infowars 95) Trivia
28) Venmo 62) Match 96) Starbucks
29) Groupon 63) PlentyofFish 97) Horoscope
30) Twitch 64) Zoosk 98) Beetles
31) Yelp 65) eHarmony 99) Glasdoor
32) Letgo 66) Okcupid 100)Tickermaster
33) Iheart 67) Badoo
34) eBay 68) Christian Mingle
Table 5: List of profiled websites.
Websites
1) Google 35) Hulu 69) BlackPeopleMeet
2) Facebook 36) Quora 70) HowAboutWe
3) Wikipedia 37) Salesforce 71) Oracle
4) Amazon 38) Wells 72) Reuters
5) Reddit 39) Bank of America 73) BBC
6) Yahoo 40) Stackoverflow 74) Nasa
7) Twitter 41) Guardian 75) Eventbrite
8) eBay 42) Forbes 76) Dailymotion
9) Netflix 43) Dropbox 77) Blogger
10) Linkedin 44) Mozilla 78) Nature
11) Office 45) Soundcloud 79) Digg
12) Cnn 46) Weebly 80) Wiley
13) Espn 47) Vimeo 81) Wired
14) Wikia 48) Adobe 82) Ted
15) Twitch 49) Wordpress 83) Feedburner
16) Live 50) Tumblr 84) Oath
17) Instagram 51) Huffington 85) Ietf
18) Craigslist 52) Breitbart 86) Nginx
19) Paypal 53) Drudgereport 87) Springer
20) Apple 54) Politico 88) Apache
21) Bing 55) The Hill 89) Flickr
22) Chase 56) Slate 90) Grawatar
23) Zillow 57) Dailykos 91) Sourceforge
24) Walmart 58) Infowars 92) Archive
25) Yelp 59) Salon 93) Go
26) Github 60) TheBlaze 94) Wix
27) NY Times 61) Match 95) Myspace
28) Pinterest 62) Plenty of Fish 96) Mysql
29) Imdb 63) Zoosk 97) Time
30) Microsoft 64) Okcupid 98) Cnbc
31) Msn 65) eHarmony 99) Skype
32) Fox News 66) Badoo 100) Alibaba
33) Blogspot 67) Christian Mingle
34) Dailymail 68) OurTime
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Table 6: CNN parameter exploration. Final selection highlighted in bold.
Convolution Max Dropout Kernel Dense Training Training Validation ValidationPooling Size Loss Accuracy (%) Loss Accuracy (%)
1024 2 0.1 3 50 0.2568 93.54 0.7092 83.04
512 2 0.1 3 50 0.2085 94.23 0.6876 84.03
256 2 0.1 3 50 0.2554 95.01 0.7127 82.75
128 2 0.1 3 50 0.2666 93.56 0.7307 82.78
64 2 0.1 3 50 0.2790 92.31 0.7342 82.68
32 2 0.1 3 50 0.5443 83.23 0.8038 80.56
16 2 0.1 3 50 0.3821 89.04 0.6910 82.38
8 2 0.1 3 50 0.4513 86.94 0.7057 82.29
512-256 2 0.1 3 50 0.2581 92.17 0.6436 84.40
512-128 2 0.1 3 50 0.3725 89.09 0.6510 84.18
512-64 2 0.1 3 50 0.6743 81.12 0.7638 80.93
512-32 2 0.1 3 50 0.4495 87.25 0.7355 81.46
512-256-128 2 0.1 3 50 0.2564 91.24 0.6440 84.55
512-256-64 2 0.1 3 50 0.3345 90.15 0.6609 84.09
512-256-32 2 0.1 3 50 0.3259 90.75 0.6984 81.25
512-256 2 0.1 3 50 0.2581 92.17 0.6436 84.40
512-256 4 0.1 3 50 0.4823 86.48 0.7467 82.45
512-256 8 0.1 3 50 0.5642 84.24 0.7160 81.54
512-256 2 0.2 3 50 0.2581 92.17 0.6436 84.80
512-256 2 0.3 3 50 0.2756 91.24 0.6783 83.34
512-256 2 0.4 3 50 0.2894 90.57 0.6928 82.86
512-256 2 0.5 3 50 0.3184 88.37 0.7293 81.43
512-256 2 0.2 6 50 0.4068 87.65 0.6583 83.45
512-256 2 0.2 9 50 0.3686 89.48 0.6314 85.21
512-256 2 0.2 18 50 0.3079 91.00 0.6794 84.82
512-256 2 0.2 27 50 0.3283 90.06 0.6915 83.87
512-256 2 0.2 9 100 0.3387 90.03 0.6836 83.07
512-256 2 0.2 9 150 0.3208 90.39 0.6456 83.57
512-256 2 0.2 9 200 0.3104 91.25 0.6218 85.76
512-256 2 0.2 9 250 0.3487 89.74 0.6424 83.38
512-256 2 0.2 9 300 0.3562 88.96 0.6592 82.51
512-256 2 0.2 9 350 0.3859 86.52 0.6834 82.15
20
